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Abstract
Given disparate beliefs about economic growth, technical change and
damage caused by climate change, this paper starts with the seeming impossibility of determining a unique time profile of the social costs of carbon
as a benchmark for climate negotiations and for infrastructure decisions
that need to be made now in the absence of an inclusive international
accord on climate policies. The paper demonstrates that determining a
workable range of the social costs of carbon is however possible in a sequential decision-making framework that permits revising initial decisions
in the light of new information. To do so, the paper exploits the results
of a stochastic optimal control model run for more than 2000 scenarios
that represent the set of beliefs presented about key uncertain parameters
in the literature. The paper provides a heuristic mapping of the climate
debate in the form of six ”clubs of opinions” and shows the possibility of
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emerge in the future.
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E-mail : perissin@centre-cired.fr
† CIRED/CIRAD
‡ CIRED

1

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

1

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 685 [2012]

1

Introduction

Even though some of the results of the two last United Nations Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen (2009) and in Cancun (2010) can be ascribed
to the vagaries of the diplomatic process and the divergences in views about how
to untie the climate and development Gordian Knot (Hourcade et al, 2009b), it
revealed large differences in the willingness to pay to tackle climate change.
The persistence of such differences, nearly 20 years after the adoption of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992) casts doubts on the relevance of the main advice stemming from wellestablished public economic principles. This advice is first, to set a trajectory
of world carbon prices that would reveal the “social costs of carbon” (SCC)
equating the discounted sum of the marginal cost of abatement with the discounted sum of the marginal cost of remaining damage, and second to arrange
for financial compensations (by means of direct transfers or generous emissions
quotas) to take into account the variations in social welfare among countries1 .
These principles seem hard to enforce in a context where, at first glance,
the published literature provides little credible guidance.The most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report gives an SCC range of US$-3
to US$95 per ton of CO2 (IPCC, 2007); R.S.J.Tol (Tol, 2005) gathers 103 estimates and finds out that the median estimate is US$4 per tCO2, the mean
US$26 per tCO2 and the 95 percentile US$97 per tCO2. The UK’s Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs recommends using an SCC value of
US$29 per tC02 for public decisions (a range of US$14 to US$58 per tCO2)
(Watkiss, 2005) and a committee of French experts recommended a SCC value
of US$60/tCO2 in 2010 rising to US$135 per tCO2 in 2030 (Quinet, 2008).
The US government selected four SCC estimates for use in regulatory analyses
based on three leading integrated assessment models (DICE, PAGE, FUND)
ranging from US$5 to US$65 per tCO2 in 2010 and rising to [US$16, US$136
per tCO2 ] in 2050 contingent on different assumptions about the discount rate
(US Regulatory Impact Analysis, 2010).
Such a large range of estimates might suggest that a compromise between
such opposing beliefs is simply unattainable2 . But time is running out and
decisive scientific information may not be available in time to end controversies about the ultimate consequences of climate change damage and the costs
of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement. Furthermore, given current levels of infrastructure investment in developing countries, the windows of opportunity for
preventing temperature increases from overshooting not only the commonly accepted 2◦ kelvin (K) target but even a 3◦ K target will quickly close (ref récente
IPCC?).
1 This comes back to the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson theorem. Obviously, the idea that
mitigating climate change constitutes a net social cost is questionable; not only because doing
so should provide a net intertemporal social benefit by reducing total mitigation costs and
damage (Shalizi and Lecocq, 2009; Stern, 2006) but also because mitigation could be financed
by redirecting investments instead of limiting consumption (Foley, 2009), thereby avoiding a
net burden for early generations. However, the mainstream view that mitigation constitutes a
net social cost at first period holds for tight climate targets and once potentials from Paretoimproving policies are exhausted.
2 The virulent reactions (Dasgupta, 2007; Maddison, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007; Weitzman,
2007; Tol and Yohe, 2007; Yohe, 2006) to the Stern Review (Stern, 2006) reinforce this pessimistic diagnosis.
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This paper suggests the possibility of making better use of current (weak) information on stakeholders’ beliefs about future growth, abatement costs, technical progress, discounting, climate outcomes to frame deliberations about climate
policies as soon as this information is employed within a transparent integrated
assessment model (IAM) framework. The paper, by means of hopefully a transparent enough modelling approach, allows us to disclose the main drivers of
the climate controversy. It makes it possible to reveal a structure of “clubs of
opinion” behind the apparent ocean of uncertainty (Lave, 1991), either exposing
the underlying worldviews of a position in the climate debate (in terms of level
of abatement or SCC) or computing the position consistent with a given set of
beliefs. Thereby it offers a consistent frame of analysis to clear up the climate
debate and makes the search for a compromise a less risky venture.
We eventually present a method to delineate different sensible spaces of
negotiation within which an international agreement about the SCC may occur.

2

RESPONSE: a Model of Optimization under
Uncertainty

2.1

Storyline of the model

RESPONSE is designed as an IAM that couples a macroeconomic optimal
growth model3 with a simple climatic model, following the tradition launched
by Nordhaus (1994) seminal DICE model by Nordhaus.
The program maximizes under uncertainty an intertemporal social welfare
function composed of the consumption of a composite good. GHG emissions
that are considered as a fatal product of the production, are responsible for temperature increase and thus for climate damage. As climate damage negates part
of the production, the optimization process consists in allocating the optimal
share of the output among consumption, abatement and investment. Rather
than traditional power functions, we use a sigmoid function (Ambrosi et al,
2003) to represent nonlinearity effects in damage (see next section for a mathematical formulation of the function). Uncertainty holds on both climate senω
) and climate damage
sitivity (and on atmospheric temperature increase θA,t
ω4
denoted by D .
To encompass the entire range of beliefs about climate damage, the model
ω
considers different states of nature for climate sensitivity (θ2x
) and for the form
of damage consistent with existing litterature. As climate change is basically
a nonreproducible event, a subjective distribution of probabilities is given to
each state of the world considering that climate sensitivity and damages are
independant as presented in table 2. These probabilities can be interpreted as
the level of confidence a stakeholder attaches to each existing climate scenario
and to each assessment of climate change impacts.
These uncertainties are resolved at a point in time denoted ti . Some may
argue that the two most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
reports, the Stern Review, and the series of climate catastrophes over the past
decade have already provided the “climate proof”, but all kinds of controversies
3 much
4 We

like Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans’ models (Ramsey, 1928; Koopmans, 1965; Cass, 1966).
assume that both uncertainties are independant
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are far from resolved. What we mean here by resolution of uncertainty is the
emergence of a consensus on the validity of information that is broad enough to
trigger ambitious collective action.
In the forthcoming simulations, the date ti is set at 2050. At the end of
the learning and self-convincing process (after ti ), people adapt their behavior
to new information. They accelerate abatement in the case of “bad news” and
relax their efforts in the case of “good news”. The question each stakeholder
must consider then becomes what is the good trade-off between the economic
risks of rapid abatement now (that premature capital stock retirement would
later be proved unnecessary) against the corresponding risks of delay (that more
rapid reduction would then be required, necessitating premature retirement of
future capital stock)?

2.2

The program of optimization

Consistently with a sequential decision-making framework, a two-step analysis is conducted that mainly consists in solving the program recursively. The
intertemporal optimization program is divided between two subprograms, after
and before the information arrival date ti respectively.
• After uncertainty is resolved
We consider first the optimization program starting at time ti when the
true state of nature of the climate sensitivity and the threshold damage
is revealed. Then ω = ω ∗ . The intertemporal maximization program
between ti and T (with T = 2200) simply writes:
V (ω ∗ ) = M ax
at ,Ct

t=T
X

t=ti +1

Nt

∗
1
u(Ctω ),
t
(1 + ρ)

where u(.) is the standard logarithmic utility function (u(C) = ln(C)),
Nt is the population at t, which is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate;
and Ctω is the consumption of a composite good at t in the states of the
world ω, and ρ being the pure time preference.
• Before uncertainty is resolved
Before information on the true states of the climate sensitivity and the
threshold parameter is revealed at time ti , the objective function of the
economy to maximize (under the two control variables at and Ct ) writes,
depending on the possible states of nature ω:
W = E[U ]
with E standing for the expectation operator according E[f ] =
and
t=t
Xi
1
U (ω) =
u(Ctω ) + V (ω).
t
(1
+
ρ)
t=0

P

ω

p(ω)f (ω),

This program is solved under the three following constraints ∀ω:
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• Capital Dynamics:
ω
ω
ω
j ω
ω
Kt+1
= (1 − δ)Ktω + (Y (Ktω , Lt ) − Ctω − Ca (aω
t , at−1 , Kt ) − D (θt,at , Kt )),

where Ktω is the capital at t, which is set at the level K t whatever the
states of the world are, when t ≤ ti ; δ is the parameter of capital depreciation; and Lt is an exogenous factor of labor that enters Y (.), the traditional
Cobb-Douglass function of production. As technical inertia is a key determinant of the problem, we follow the route initiated by (Ha-Duong et al,
1997) and consider the following abatement cost function:


ν
(aω
Y0 2 ω
t)
ω
ω
ω
ω
2
a
ζ
+
(BK
−
ζ)
Ca (aω
,
a
,
K
)
=
P
T
Etω
+
ξ
(a
−
a
)
t
t
t
t−1
t
t
t−1
ν
E0
5
ω
where aω
t is the fraction of emissions cut . at is set at the level at whatever
the states of the world are, when t ≤ ti . As the capital is also set before
ti , this means that only the consumption Ctω may vary depending on
and climate damage. The cost function has two main components: the
(aω )ν
absolute level of abatement tν , with ν being a power coefficient, and
a path-dependent function that penalizes the speed of decarbonization
ω
(aω
t − at−1 ) so that the costs of totally decarbonizing the economy in 50
years is 1% of annual GDP, whereas the cost is 25 percent of annual gross
domestic product (GDP) if total abatement is achieved within 10 years.
P Tt is a parameter of exogenous technical progress, BK stands for the
current price of backstop technology, ζ and ξ are fixed parameters, and
Etω represents the level of emissions. Emissions are considered here as a
fatal product and can be written as:
ω
Etω = σt (1 − aω
t )Y (Kt , Lt ),

where σt is the carbon intensity of production which declines progressively
thanks to technical progress (σ0 = E0 /Y0 ).
ω
ω
Finally Dω (θt,at
, Ktω ) denotes damage induced by θt,at
, the temperature
increase due to GHG emissions from the pre-industrial period to the date
t. Rather than traditional power functions, we use sigmoid functions
(Ambrosi et al, 2003) to represent nonlinearity effects in damage (see the
appendix for a mathematical formulation of the function). Within capital
dynamics, damage negates part of the production, which has to be shared
among consumption, abatement and investment.

• Abatement constraint:
0 ≤ aω
t ≤1

(2.1)

• Temperature and Carbon Dynamics:
5 If aω = 1, then emissions become null. By contrast, if aω = 0, then no attempts at
t
t
abatement have been made.
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The following equation links temperature increase at time t to past carbon
emissions flows Et , Et−1 up to E 0 6 .
ω
θt,at
= F (ETω , ETω−1 , ..., Etωinf o +1 , E tinf o ..., E 0 ).

This function incorporates the linear three-reservoir model of carbon cycle by Nordhaus (Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999) and a temperature model resembling Schneider and Thompson’s two-box model (Schneider and Thompson,
1981) (see appendix for a detailed presentation of carbon and temperature
dynamics).

2.3

The Social Cost of Carbon

The SCC accounts for the monetized value of the climate externality or
society’s willingness to pay to tackle climate change. Along an optimal path of
CO2 emissions, the SCC is the value equating at each date the discounted sum
of the marginal cost of abatement with the discounted sum of the marginal cost
of remaining damage (Nordhaus, 2008; Pearce, 2003; Tol, 2005). This optimality
rule makes it possible to delineate the efficient border of mitigation efforts.
More precisely, the SCC accounts at the optimium for both the economic
cost induced by the emission of an extra unit of CO2 in the atmosphere, in
terms of social utility loss, and the economic cost of preventing the emissions
of one extra unit of CO2 . The SCC is theoretically interpreted as the set of
shadow prices of carbon along a constrained CO2 emission trajectory and its
value increases over time as one approaches carbon constraints (or potential
high damage) as long as very cheap carbon free techniques are not available
at large scale (the value of the SCC is necessarily capped by the cost of the
backstop).
Analitically, at each date t the SCC roughly writes (see appendix for a precise
presentation of the analytical formula of the SCC for all dates):
SCC(t) =

∂W/∂aω
t
∂W/∂Ctω

The denominator is the marginal welfare value of a unit of consumption in
period t, while the numerator accounts for the marginal impact of abatement
ω
on welfare. As aω
t is expressed in utility per ton of CO2 and Ct in utility per
$, the ratio translates the impact and thus the SCC in $ per tCO2 .

2.4

A Political Economy Interpretation of a Sequential
Modeling Framework

Surprisingly disregarded in the debates opened up by the Stern Report
(Hourcade et al, 2009a) sequential decision-making frameworks addressed early
on the question of the timing of GHG abatement in order to go beyond the
intrinsic limits of one-shot decision frameworks to tackle an issue that scientists
have seen as a problem for more than two decades (Manne and Richels, 1992).
The basic principle was to mobilize variants of optimal control models that calculate the optimal trajectory to be followed in the absence of information about
6 Note that before t
inf o , as abatement and capital are set whatever the states of the world
are, emissions flows are also set.
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the ultimate level of climate change damage before a date ti of information
disclosure.
The logic of these types of models is to attribute subjective probabilities to
future damage (or to proxies such as the ultimate concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere or temperature targets) during the pre-ti period and to assess the
pre-ti emissions pathway considering the costs of redirecting the initial course
of action after ti . The model then weights the costs of ambitious GHGs abatement now against the costs of accelerated action later (Ha-Duong et al, 1997;
Hammitt et al, 1992). Obviously as many first periods optimal pathways and
trajectories of SCC are available as are sets of beliefs about climate change damage. A well-intentioned chair of a conference of parties can use this information
to assess the existence of “corridors” of values within which the greatest number
of countries can reach a compromise.
In this paper we use the RESPONSE model to capture not only the set of
beliefs about climate change damage, but also a larger set of assumptions about
the future, namely:
• assumptions about economic growth, future GHG emissions, and costs of
cutting emissions;
• normative parameters that translate consumption flows into utility flows,
and balance the utility of present and future generations through pure
time preference;
• beliefs about climate change damage through the shape of the damage
function and the climate sensitivity parameter;
• probability weights attached to each belief during the first period before
the resolution of uncertainty at date ti .
Thus we address a wide spectrum of worldviews defined as the combination
of technico-economic parameters, climate and normative parameters (see figure
1) in order to cover the whole range of views expressed in the climate debate.
However, these modeling experiments rely on an important political precondition, that is, adoption of a sequential decision framework with progressive
resolution of uncertainty, which in turn requires a specific political attitude on
the part of all parties. This attitude consists of adhering to the old Roman
saying audivi alteram partem (I listened to the other party), that is recognizing
that those who do not share one’s vision of the world may be right. Such wise
political behavior makes it possible to both select an abatement pathway by
the date of arrival of complete information and preserve the option of switching
back to concentration targets that conform to updated information.

3

Worldviews Structuring the Climate Debate

We define a worldview as a set of beliefs about six key and controversial
parameters: economic growth, speed of autonomous decarbonization of the production system, technical costs of reducing GHG emissions, weight given to
future generations, magnitude of climate change damage, and index of climate
sensitivity.
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Tecnico-economic parameters
•Economic growth
•Mitigation costs
•Baseline emissions

RESPONSE
Climate parameters
•Climate sensitivity
•Climate damage

Ethic parameter
•Pure time preference

Figure 1: The three main components of a worldview

To cover the array of scientific opinions, we retained the extreme values given
by the last Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report (IPCC, 2007)
for each parameter (see table 1 and 2)7 .

3.1

Technico-Economic and Normative Parameters

In the baseline scenario, that is when climate change is not considered, the
economic growth, during the entire 21st century, averages 1.45 percent through
3 percent. The impact of economic growth on the volume of carbon emissions
is determined by the carbon intensity, σt , which in turn is driven by ψt , which
captures the joint impact of technical change and depletion of fossil resources:
σt = σ0 e−ψt t with ψt > 0. For a given population level, the level of carbon
emissions is proportional to E0 e(g−ψt )t . As long as g > ψt (with ψt set at its
initial level), carbon emissions would continue to grow over time for most (ψ0 ,
g) pairs. To guarantee that emissions decrease by the end of the century, as
predicted by the overwhelming majority of available scenarios, ψt progressively
increases so that it can become higher than g as follows:
ψt = ψ0 e−βt + 1.1g(1 − e−βt ),
7 With respect to abatement costs, criticisms of (Pielke et al, 2008) in N ature concern the
figures published in the synthesis report. We retained here the primary material of the report
that includes both optimistic and pessimistic cost assumptions.
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Table 1: All Socioeconomic Scenarios Implemented by the Model

Sensitive variables
Economic
growth
Emissions
Abatement
costs
Ethical
preferences
on
future

Parameters of the
model

lower value

upper value

ln(Yt /Y0 )
t

1.45%.year−1

3%.year−1

Parameter of decarbonization ψ0
BK2008 , ν, ζ, α

0.5%/year

1.5%/year

110$/t CO2 , 3,
0, 1%
0.1%

1023$/t CO2 , 4,
15, 1.35%
2%

Pure time preference ρ

with β > 0, the speed of growth of ψt . Thus,
σt = σ0 e−(ψ0 e

−βt

+1.1g(1−e−βt ))t

.

Beliefs about mitigation costs are captured through the price of the backstop
carbon-free technology BK2008 capable of achieving total abatement of CO2
emissions. This technology is supposed to be available at each time period,
with its costs declining over time. The most recent Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change report does not explicitly refer to the costs of backstops,
but they can be determined from the panel’s publiched cost data (IPCC 2007,
Figure 3.25). We retained an initial range of US$110 to US$1,023 per abated
tCO2] and decreases at a rate of 1 percent for optimistic opinions and 1.35
percent for pessimistic opinions.
As regards the pure time preference ρ, this is not the place for putting an
end to the dispute between the advocates of normative choice of that parameter
and the advocates of a positive approach consistent with observed behavior and
virulent ethical controversies rooted in old intellectual traditions, for example
Ramsey (1928) vs Koopmans et al (1964). This is why we retained two extreme values of ρ = 0.1 percent as recommended by Stern (2006) and 2 percent
(Weitzman, 2007).
The combination of values in table 1 gives 24 (16) scenarios.

3.2

Climate Parameters

Table 2 shows the values retained for climate sensitivity and the threshold of
temperature increase that triggers nonlinear damage. We consider five possible
levels for climate sensitivity θ2x (1.5◦ K, 2.3◦ K, 3◦ K, 3.8◦ K and 4.5◦ K),8 and we
describe damage through a hybrid linear-sigmoid function rather than a power
function to capture the possible emergence of nonlinear damage (Ambrosi et al,
2003). We consider five possible levels of thresholds of temperature increase Z
(2.0◦ K, 2.5◦ K, 3.0◦ K, 3.5◦ K and 4.0◦ K), beyond which catastrophic events, in
8 Some studies propose higher values for climate sensitivity, with a skewed distribution
(Roe and Baker, 2007; Weitzman, 2009). Here we stick to the IPCC range.
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Table 2: Table of all scenarios of potential damages. A state of the world ω is a
singleton of a pair (Z, θ2x ). The distribution q on Z and and q ′ on θ2xPare considered
s
as independant so that for ω = (Z j , θ2x
), p(ω) = qs qj′ and E[f (ω)] = ω p(ω)fω

Types of beliefs
Temperature thresholds
of damages triggering (in
◦
K)
Distributions of
probabilities
Expected damages for
2◦ K increase of mean
temperatures
Values of climate sensitivity (in ◦ K)
Distributions of
probabilities
Expected beliefs on the
value of climate sensitivity

Optimistic
Moderate
Pessimistic
Z 1 = 2, Z 2 = 2.5, Z 3 = 3, Z 4 = 3.5, Z 5 = 4

q1 = 0.02
q2 = 0.03
q3 = 0.1
q4 = 0.3
q5 = 0.55
0.8% of GDP

q1 = 0.1
q2 = 0.25
q3 = 0.3
q4 = 0.25
q5 = 0.1
2% of GDP

q1 = 0.55
q2 = 0.3
q3 = 0.1
q4 = 0.03
q5 = 0.02
3.2% of GDP

1
2
3
4
5
θ2x
= 1.5, θ2x
= 2.3, θ2x
= 3, θ2x
= 3.8, θ2x
= 4.5

q1′ = 0.7
q2′ = 0.2
q3′ = 0.05
q4′ = 0.03
q5′ = 0.02
1.9◦ K

q1′ = 0.05
q2′ = 0.15
q3′ = 0.6
q4′ = 0.15
q5′ = 0.05
3◦ K

q1′ = 0.02
q2′ = 0.03
q3′ = 0.05
q4′ = 0.2
q5′ = 0.7
4.2◦ K
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Weitzman’s sense (Weitzman, 2009), cannot be excluded. Note that overshooting those thresholds does not suddenly trigger the total effect of climate change
damage (6% of GDP loss). Damage spreads progressively over a temperature
range η, which corresponds to an arbitrary additional 0.6◦ K (for instance, over
the range [1.7◦ K, 2.3◦ K] for the lowest possible threshold).
For each parameter, three opinions are represented, each of them defined by
a specific distribution of probabilities on the different possible values of the two
uncertain parameters. An optimistic (or pessimistic) belief about the threshold
is consistent with a probability distribution that puts a greater weight on the
highest (the lowest) value of the threshold (respectively 4◦ K or 2◦ K) and a
declining weight on other levels of the threshold. In the same way, optimistic
(or pessimistic) beliefs about climate sensitivity are represented by a probability
distribution that puts a greater weight on its lowest (highest) value (respectively
1.5◦ K or 4.5◦ K).
Combining the numerical assumptions displayed in table 2 gives 32 (9) climate damage scenarios. Combining them with the 16 economic scenarios gives
144 integrated scenarios that cover the entire range of logically possible opinions
in the climate debate9 .

4

A heuristic mapping of the climatic debate

Running RESPONSE for each of the 144 scenarios gives as many optimal
time profiles of the SCC and of abatement levels. Along an optimal path, the
SCC, (see the appendix for the method of calculating the SCC) at each date
delineates the efficient border of mitigation efforts, according to the simple rule
that emission reductions are worthwhile until their discounted marginal cost
equals the discounted marginal damage they mitigate.
As the core of the policy debate is about the decisions to be taken during
the next decade we exploit the simulation results for 2020. Figure 1 plots the
pair (SCC, abatement) for each scenario, namely, the marginal effort accepted
by the holder of each set of beliefs and the quantity of abatement that holder
expects.
Interestingly, the pairs of results cover wide ranges of [-120 percent, 40 percent] for abatement and of [US$0, US$240] per tCO2 for the price of carbon.
Such ranges suggest no progress from the initial range of uncertainty we started
from. The only difference is the absence of negative SCC.
A more in depth examination shows that even though the prices people are
willing to pay are higher as the more damage they expect, and, for a given belief
about damage their expectations about costly emission reductions, the precise
position of each person depends on a wider set of assumptions about economic
growth, climate sensitivity, mitigation costs, and pure time preference. Indeed,
as each scenario was calibrated from the bounds of each range of parameters,
and thanks to the global monotonicity of the model, the results plotted in Figure
2 draw the boundaries of the climate debate10 .
9 All logically possible combinations may not be equally consistent because driving parameters of the model , such as economic growth, cost of mitigation, and pure time preference are
not independent. That is why we first removed the most unlikely combinations to consider
only the more likely scenarios. As such an operation does not basically modify the range of
results, we keep every logical scenario.
10 Such monotonicity was verified through the runs resulting from the densification of the
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Price of carbon (US$/tCO2)

250

activists
panglossians
hardliners
doomists
skeptical ecologists
churchillians

200

150

100

50

0
−1.2

−1

−0.8

−0.6

−0.4

−0.2

0

0.2

0.4

Fraction of abatement compared with emissions in 1990
Figure 2: Heuristic Mapping of the Climate Debate in 2020, with the x axis standing
for emissions’ reduction in respect to 1990 emission levels, and the y axis representing
carbon prices. The mapping distinguishes six “clubs of opinion” according their optimal pair (abatement, price). For instance, in the upper right part of the figure, empty
squares represent the stance of “hardliners” in the debate on climate

Table 3: Worldviews and Clubs of Opinion. Activists’ Club for instance is composed of
people who believe in all possible trends of emissions, have both low and high pure time
preference, are optimistic about abatement costs and either moderate or pessimistic
about climate damage and temperature change

Emission
trends

Abatement
costs

Activists

All

Optimistic

Pure
time
preference
(ethics)
0.1 or 2%

Churchillians
Panglossians
Skeptical
ecologists
Hard-liners

All
All
most low

Optimistic
Optimistic
Pessimistic

0.1%
most 2%
most 2%

All

Pessimistic

most 0.1%

Doomists

High

Pessimistic

2%

Damage,
temperature
change
most moderate, some
pessimistic
Pessimistic
Optimistic
most optimistic
most
Pessimistic
Pessimistic
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Returning to the set of assumptions behind each dot in figure 2 provides
a vivid representation of positions that can be polarized around six clubs of
opinion11 composed of people who, although they do not share exactly the
same set of beliefs (table 3), have similar views about what to do now?. This
typology is composed of six clubs:
• Activists. This club, which is strongly in favor of climate mitigation,
consists of people who believe that damage from climate change will be
anywhere from significant to potentially catastrophic, but that mitigation
costs are low. This technological optimism is consistent with a low price
of backstop technology of around US$100 in 2020 per abated ton of carbon dioxide. This allows the activists to promote an ambitious goal of
abatement to avoid the possibility of damage threshold outbreak following a low temperature increase (+2◦ K) only with moderate carbon prices
(< U S$100);
• Churchillians. These share great optimism about technology with the
activists and are convinced of the seriousness of the climate threat. This
is why they are extremely pessimistic about both damage and climate
sensitivity. They are ready to adopt an even more ambitious strategy, as
their extremely low pure time preference (0.1 percent) makes them ready
to spare no “pain and tears” today to avoid a damage threshold at(+2◦ K).
• Panglossians. These are named after Voltaire’s eternal optimist, Master Pangloss. Their view is that abatement costs are extremely low, but
do not justify strong action, because whatever the level of emissions, net
damage due to climate change will also be extremely low. They set the
dangerous temperature threshold around 4◦ K and believe in low values of
climate sensitivity near 2◦ K. They do not fear overshooting the two first
possible thresholds (as they ascribe a low probability of attaining them)
but are willing to prevent overshooting the two last thresholds (although
with very low SCC). Despite doubts about the accuracy of the Panglossians’ combination of assumptions retained by the Panglossians we will
retain them because they are consistent with many political and media
discourses that are trying to calm public concerns created by the “ecological Cassandras” and to prove that something can be done at almost no
cost, thanks to technology.
• Skeptical ecologists. This club consists mostly of people who do not
believe in the seriousness of the climate threat, such as Lomborg (2001),
or who are moderately concerned if baseline emissions are high. However, contrary to the Panglossians, they are pessimistic about abatement
costs and are therefore not eager to devote much effort to climate mitigation. Nevertheless, they accept the need for some precautionary efforts
values of technico-economic and normative parameters (see section 5). Then we can argue
that monotonicity is verified for almost all worldviews but some coming from doomists on the
lower left side and some from hard-liners on the upper right side of the mapping, making the
mapping a sensible proxy of the boundaries of the climate debate
11 This
interpretation was inspired by L.B. Lave and H. Dowlatabadi
(Lave and Dowlatabadi, 1993) who provide a typology of four positions: Dr. Pangloss,
Mr. Doom, industrialists and ecologist activists.
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(as they give some weight to the possibility of extensive damage given a
large temperature increase) to avoid the highest possible threshold of 4◦ K.
Thus they are ready to accept carbon prices of US$5 to US$25, with an
upper limit higher than that of the Panglossians’ because the Skeptical
Ecologists are more pessimistic about mitigation costs.
• Hardliners. This club consists of radical pessimists who believe in potentially catastrophic damage from climate change and are also pessimistic
about the costs of avoiding them. Faced with this dark diagnosis they advocate for a hardline attitude because they are eager to sacrifice themselves
for future generations (many share a 0.1 percent pure time preference) to
avoid the first threshold of damage. Consequently, they are ready to pay a
carbon price as high as US$240 even when it results in emission reductions
of barely 20 percent.
• Doomists. Members of this group share the same pessimism as the hardliners, but are paralyzed by a doomsday outlook. They have a high pure
time preference and are not ready for big sacrifices today, and as they
believe catastrophe is almost inevitable, they want to enjoy the present
as much as possible. In a way, they behave as if a window of opportunity
for mitigation policies were already closed and the time for preventing
temperatures from overshooting the lowest threshold has passed.

5

Delineating Negotiation Spaces

Our heuristic mapping provides an overview of the climate debate that is not
narrower but more structured and informative than the initial range of carbon
prices: polarization around six clubs of opinion (see figure 2) and unevenly
distributed results with respect to density. The point is that individuals with
quite different beliefs, can promote the same carbon price for distinct reasons.
For example, some Activists will promote a given price with the goal of achieving
low GHG stabilization levels, whereas some Skeptical Ecologists will see the
same price as a way of avoiding more costly efforts, which would be undesirable
given their optimistic vision of damage caused by climate change.
To examine the negotiation space further, we need to go beyond the 144
scenarios analyzed so far. These scenarios aimed at marking the boundaries
of the climate debate; we retained five levels of climate sensitivity to examine
uncertainty about the threshold date, but only two levels of abatement costs.
This does not provide a realist picture of the continuum of values and of the
density of the negotiation space in the real world. We therefore define five levels
of abatement costs, of economic growth, of the rate of decarbonization, and of
pure time preference which gives us 2,304 scenarios, when combined with the
parameters of damage due to climate change.
This extended set of simulations shows that the distribution of the SCC
is skewer than the distribution of abatement (see figures 3 and 4). Box plot
analysis points out that the distribution of the SCC is much more concentrated
around the lower values than the distribution of abatement and displays more
and (percentile(90)−percentile(10))
outliers. The ratios (percentile(75)−percentile(25))
median
median
corresponding to an index of the dispersion of a distribution are both smaller
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Figure 4: Boxplot of abatement (left) and the SCC (right)

for abatement distribution (respectively 1.32 and 2.52) than for SCC one’s (respectively 1.72 and 3.82). That the range of SCC is skewer than the range of
desired abatement level is not surprising for those familiar with the application
to climate change (Pizer, 2002) of Weitzman’s approach to the choice between
prices and quantities (Weitzman, 1974).
The question now is how to move from this diagnosis to policy implications.
One possibility could be to assign a probability coefficient to each parameter
value and to each combination of parameters, and performing thus a kind of climate policy weighting. In principle three methodological options could be used,
namely, (a) conducting world scale global opinion poll, (b) carrying out experimental economic studies to shed light on correlations between beliefs and to
remove psychologically inconsistent combinations, and (c) conducting an expert
analysis of the likelihood of each parameter and combination.
However, all three options confront intrinsic difficulties. The first option
must deal with determining representative samples and a set of questions that
are meaningful at the world scale. The second option must certify that the
15
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results of the experiments are not culture specific. The third option faces a
problem of selection bias given discrepancies among experts’ beliefs.
This is why, for lack of anything better, we believe that interesting insights
can be from our results database by using a simple equal weighting of worldviews. This leads to a mean value of US$29 per tCO2 in 2020 and US$43 in
2040. The median values US$16.3 in 2020 and US$25.6 per tCO2 in 2040 delineate the upper and lower range that gather 50% of the worldviews. Another way
to organize the results consists of building possible corridors of the SCC within
which at least 50% of the worldviews could agree. For instance, the ranges
[US$2.3, US$17] in 2020 and [US$3, US$26.5] in 2040 are the smallest ranges
that gather 50% of the worldviews while the range of the 25 - 75 percentiles
is [US$8.5, US$36.6] in 2020 and [US$11.5, US$55.8] in 2040. In turn, around
the mean, those ranges become [US$13, US$81] in 2020 and [US$19, US$108]
in 2040.
Even though the outcome of future international negotiations will necessarily
be chaotic, a compromise is likely to be found by means of an arrangement
leading to SCC lying within one of this range. Given the absence of a worldwide
voting process whereby a majority would emerge for either a median value or
in favor of a defined range, analysing whether, in a political game, a majority
alliance between clubs has a chance to be formed around this range is interesting.
Actually, the lower the range the easier to get an agreement because those who
prefer a more proactive attitude, will logically not block (except those who
defend the most radical positions that might prefer “nothing” to “not enough”)
a level of action that is below their willingness to pay to tackle the climate
threat. Symetrically the highest corridor that ranges from the median to the
highest value reflects the maximum politically feasible agreement. Still, given
the skewness of the distribution of the SCC toward the lowest values, such
corridor is very wide ([US$16.3, US$240] in 2020) and may not be seen as the
most relevant negotiation space as it only provides a poor signal for action. As
the smallest ranges that gather 50% of the worldviews may give to much weight
to the lowest values because, once again, of the skewness of the distribution,
we believe that both the range of the 25 - 75 percentiles and the range around
the mean are good candidates to delineate the negotiation space. Only the
Planglossians, who strongly push for a lower value of SCC would systematically
fight such a coalition. This makes the case for considering the median value as
a credible benchmark for negotiating the Social Cost of Carbon.

6

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis originates in doubts about the utility of the notion
of SCC to appraise countries’s willingness to pay to tackle the climate issue
and frame climate policies, given the ethical and scientific controversies that
surround the key parameters involved in calculating the SCC. The incremental
value of the analysis consists of exposing the main drivers that explain the wide
discrepancy in results found in the litterature about the SCC. RESPONSE provides then decision-makers with a transparent mapping of the climate debate,
doing a sort of “round trip” from positions in the debate to their underlying
worldviews (resulting from combinations of alternative assumptions about damage from climate change, GHG abatement costs, baseline GDP growth, carbon
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intensity, and pure time preferences) or from worldviews to resulting positions
in terms of abatement and SCC. It offers a frame of analysis to organize and
structure the debate. Despite the existence of six clubs of opinions, we suggests that the ranges of the 25 - 75 percentiles – [US$8.5, US$36.6] in 2020 and
[US$11.5, US$55.8] in 2040 – or the ranges around the mean – [US$13, US$81]
in 2020 and [US$19, US$108] in 2040 – can be considered as a proxy of the
negotiating space and that the median values US$16.3 in 2020 and US$25.6 per
tCO2 in 2040 can be used as a credible benchmark to guide decision-makers.
This result confirms the attractiveness of hybrid architecture that combines
quantitative targets over the long run and signals about common SCC, whether
in the form of price caps and price floors in Kyoto-type systems (Hourcade and Ghersi,
2002; Philibert and Pershing, 2001), carbon taxes, or shadow prices of carbon
in new funding facilities.
The political precondition for that convergence toward a range of SCC is that
stakeholders, with their own worldview accept that others may be right and seek
a compromise about an initial GHG abatement trajectory that minimizes the
costs of correcting the course of action in the light of new information.
In addition to this “philosophical” point, our modelling approach has also
pragmatic implications. For those who think that the aftermath of the Cancun
conference means that any binding climate architecture is out of reach for now
we believe that our results provide some guidance on long-lived infrastructure
to investors who confront the absence of a credible signal about future values
of carbon. Our results indicate the range of values that might underpin a world
compromise and that should be included in project appraisals to avoid having
long-lived infrastructure implementing now from being economically unviable
some decades into the future in case a meaningful climate agreement is eventually politically negotiated. The range of uncertainty is still large, from 1 to 4 or
5, but is common for many parameters of such investments and could be used
in risk coverage mechanisms and re-insurance funds to lower the risk-premium
of low carbon investments.

Appendix
A

The model

We built an integrated assessment model that couples a macroeconomic optimal growth model with a climatic one. Here we present the basic equations of
the model and the main analytical results.
Recall that the benevolent social planner has to maximize the following
objective,
• After uncertainty is resolved between ti and T (with T = 2200):
V (ω ∗ ) = M ax

at ,Ct ,...

t=T
X

t=ti +1

Nt

∗
1
u(Ctω ),
(1 + ρ)t

• Before uncertainty is resolved, i.e. before ti :
!
#
" t=t
Xi
1
ω
u(Ct ) + V (ω∗) ,
M ax W = M ax E
at ,Ct ,...
at ,Ct ,...
(1 + ρ)t
t=0
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under four constraints. ∀ω, these constraints are as follows:
• Capital dynamics (as presented in the text):
ω
ω
ω
ω ω
ω
Kt+1
= (1− δ)Ktω + (Y (Ktω , Lt )− Ctω − Ca (aω
t , at−1 , Kt )− D (θt,at , Kt )),

with,


Dω (θtω , Ktω ) = α(θtω ) +

d
ω
ω
1 + ((2 − e)/e)2(Z −θt )/η



Y (Ktω , Lt ),

and,


ν
(aω
Y0 2 ω
t)
ω
ω
ω
ω
2
a
ζ
+
(BK
−
ζ)
Ca (aω
,
a
,
K
)
=
P
T
Etω ,
+
ξ
(a
−
a
)
t
t
t
t−1
t
t
t−1
ν
E0
with the following equation for emissions (before abatement):
ω
Etω = σt (1 − aω
t Y (Kt , Lt );

• Carbon dynamics as a three-reservoir linear carbon-cycle model: We use
Nordhaus’ C-Cycle (Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999), a linear three-reservoir
model (atmosphere, biosphere + surface ocean and deep ocean). Each
reservoir is assumed to be homogeneous (well mixed in the short run) and
is characterized by a residence time inside the box and corresponding mixing rates with the two other reservoirs (longer timescales). Carbon flows
between reservoirs depend on constant transfer coefficients. GHG emissions (solely CO2 ) accumulate in the atmosphere and are slowly removed
by biospheric and oceanic sinks.
The dynamics of carbon flows is given by:
 ω 
 ω 
At+1
At
ω
ω
 Bt+1
 = Ctrans  Btω  + (1 − aω
t )Et v,
ω
ω
Ot+1
Ot

(A.1)

ω
where Aω
t represents the carbon content of the atmosphere at time t, Bt ,
represents the carbon contents of the upper ocean and biosphere at time
t, Otω , the carbon contents of deep ocean at time t. Note that before ti ,
the carbon content of each reservoir is set and written as follows At , B t ,
Ot . Ctrans is the net transfer coefficient matrix and v is a column vector
(1,0,0). Nordhaus’ calibration of existing carbon-cycle models gives the
following results (for a decadal time step):

Ctrans



c11
=  c21
0

c12
c22
c32

 
0.66616
0
c23  =  0.33384
0
c33

0.27607
0.60897
0.11496


0
0.00422 
0.99578

A criticism of this C-cycle model is that the transfer coefficients are constant. In particular, they do not depend on the carbon content of the
reservoir, for example, deforestation hindering biospheric sinks (Gitz et al,
2003), nor are they influenced by ongoing climate change, for instance,
positive feedbacks between climate change and the carbon cycle.
18
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• Temperatures dynamics as a reduced-form climate model: This model resembles Schneider and Thompson’s two-box model (Schneider and Thompson,
1981). Two equations are used to describe global mean temperature variation (A.3) since pre-industrial times in response to additional humaninduced forcing (A.2). More precisely, the model describes the modification of the thermal equilibrium between the atmosphere and surface ocean
in response to anthropogenic greenhouse effects.
The radiative forcing equation is given by:
Ft (Aω
t ) = F2x

log(Aω
t /AP I )
,
log 2

(A.2)

where Ft is the radiative forcing at time t (W.m−2 ); F2x is the instantaneous radiative forcing for a doubling of pre-industrial concentration, set
at 3.71 W.m−2 ; and AP I is the atmospheric concentration at pre-industrial
times, set at 280 ppm.
The temperature increase equation is given by:
 ω  

ω
σ1 (− Fθω2x θt,at
))
− σ2 φ ω
+ Ft (Aω
θt,at
t
T
2x
=
,
ω
θt,oc
σ3 φ ω
T

(A.3)

ω
ω
where θt,at
and θt,oc
are, respectively, global mean atmospheric and oceanic
temperature rises from pre-industrial times (in degrees kelvin); φω
T is the
ω
ω
ω
ω
difference between θt,at
and θt,oc
(φω
=
θ
−
θ
),
σ
,
σ
,
and
σ3 are
1
2
t,at
t,oc
T
s
transfer coefficients, and T2x
is climate sensitivity.

• Abatement constraint:
0 ≤ aω
t ≤ 1.

B

Lagrange equation: capturing the basic features of a three time periods problem

The lagrangian of the problem is composed of the objective function (intertemporal maximization of consumption) and of three clusters of dynamic
equations that are defined in a different manner before, during and after uncertainty resolution:
#
"t=T −1
X
1
u(Ctω )
L = E
t
(1
+
ρ)
t=0
+Li− + Li + Li+

The Li− and Li+ clusters which corresponds to before and after uncertainty
resolution (ti ) are rather similar; they differ in that, before ti , the control variables are the same in every worldview and depend upon an a priori weighting
of all the possible states of the world, while they depend only on one of these
states of the world after uncertainty resolution. Li corresponds to a transitory
period at which control variables are dependent upon the revealed state of the
world while some dynamic variables are still constrained and identical because
they result from the expected value of ex-ante future states of the world. This
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feature of the problem is the only way through which the costs of redirecting an
initial pathway under inertia constraints can be represented, and we will come
back to this later.
At each period of time, the lagrangian is composed of three dynamic equations. The first relates to the carbon cycle, the second to the temperature
increase and the third to the capital accumulation12
Before uncertainty resolution the lagrangian writes:
 

ti
At+1 − c11 At + c12 B t + (1 − at )σt Y (K t , Lt )
X

(λat,t , λbio,t , λoc,t ) 
Li− =
B t+1 − (c21 At + c22 B t + c23 Ot )
t=0
Ot+1 − (c32 B t + c33 Ot )
"t +1
!#
i
ω
ω
ω
X
θat,t+1
− ((1 − σ1 ( θFs 2x + σ2 ))θat,t
+ σ1 σ2 θoc,t
+ σ1 Ft (At ))
ω
ω
2x,at
+E
(ωat,t , ωoc,t )
ω
ω
ω
θoc,t+1
− (σ3 θat,t
+ (1 − σ3 )θoc,t
)
t=0
#
" t
i
X
j ω
ω
ω
+E
µt (−K t+1 + (1 − δ)K t + Y (K t , Lt ) − Ca (at , at−1 , K t ) − D (θat,t , K t ) − Ct )
t=0

At uncertainty resolution, abatement and investment depend on the (recently revealed) state of the world. This complexifies the lagrangian since other
variables depend on controls that were independent of the state of the world in
the previous period. Those variables, thus, start to depend on the state of the
world with a one period delay:
Li

=

ω
ω
E[λω
at,ti +1 ] Ati +2 − c11 Ati +1 + c12 B ti +1 + (1 − ati +1 )σt Y (K ti +1 , Lti +1 )


B ti +2 − (c21 Ati +1 + c22 B ti +1 + c23 Oti +1 )
+(λbio,ti +1 , λoc,ti +1 )
Oti +2 − (c32 B ti +1 + c33 Oti +1 )



ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
+Γ(λω
at,ti +2 , λbio,ti +2 , λoc,ti +2 , Ati +3 , Bti +3 , O ti +3 , Ati +2 , B ti +2 , O ti +2 , ati +2 , Kti +2 )

ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
ω
+Γ(λω
at,ti +3 , λbio,ti +3 , λoc,ti +3 , Ati +4 , Bti +4 , Oti +4 , Ati +3 , Bti +3 , O ti +3 , ati +3 , Kti +3 )
ω
ω
+Eω [µω
ti +1 ] − Kti +2 + (1 − δ)K ti +1 + Y (K ti +1 , Lti +1 ) − Ca (ati +1 , ati , K ti +1 )

ω
−Dω (θat,t
, K ti +1 ) − Ctωi +1
i +1

Γ(.) represents, in a compact form, the carbon equation when compartments
B and O start depending on the state of the world.
After uncertainty resolution, one retrieves the three dynamic equations, here
for each state of the world:
12 For each equation specific for a state of the world, the lagrange multiplier is scaled by the
probability of this state of the world, to lead to first order condition with easier interpretations.
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=

Li+


ω
ω
ω
ω
Aω
t+1 − (c11 At + c12 Bt + (1 − at )σt Y (Kt , Lt ))
ω
ω
ω
ω
ω


Bt+1
− (c21 Aω
(λω
E
t + c22 Bt + c23 Ot )
at,t , λbio,t , λoc,t )
ω
ω
ω
t=ti +4
Ot+1 − (c32 Bt + c33 Ot )


T
−1
X

T
−1
X

+E

ω
ω
(ωat,t
, ωoc,t
)

t=ti +2

T
−1
X

+E

ω
ω
ω
θt+1,at
− ((1 − σ1 ( θFω 2x + σ2 ))θat,t
+ σ1 σ2 θoc,t
+ σ1 Ft (Aω
t ))
2x,at
ω
ω
ω
θt+1,oc − (σ3 θat,t + (1 − σ3 )θoc,t )
ω
ω
ω
ω ω
ω
µω
t − Kt+1 + (1 − δ)Kt + Y (Kt , Lt ) − Ca (at , at−1 , Kt )

t=ti +2
ω ω
−D (θat,t , Ktω )

C

!

− Ctω



First-order Conditions and Calculation of the
Social Cost of Carbon

We only present the equations that are used to compute the SCC. They
result from the first-order conditions relative to consumption and abatement

C.1

First-order Conditions

First-order condition relative to consumption is,
∀t, and ∀ω:
 ω
∂L
Ct
µω
t
′
=
0
⇒
u
=
t ,

∂Ctω
Nt
1

(C.1)

1+ρ

µω
t

is the discounted marginal utility.
First-order conditions relative to abatement write, ∀t < ti :

∂L−
i
=0
∂at

⇔

λat,t σt Y (K t , Lt ) = E [µt ] Ca′ 1 (at , at−1 , K t ) + E [µt+1 ] Ca′ 2 (at+1 , at , K t+1 )

For t = ti , that is at the information arrival date:
∂L−
i
=0
∂at

⇔



λat,t σt Y (K t , Lt ) = E [µt ] Ca′ 1 (at , at−1 , K t ) + E µti +1 Ca′ 2 (aω∗
ti +1 , at , K t+1 )

For t = ti +1, that is just after the information arrival date, the formula rewrites:
∂Lt+
i

∂aω∗
ti +1

=0

⇔

ω∗
′
ω∗
′
ω∗
ω∗
ω∗
ω∗
λω∗
at,ti +1 σt Y (K ti +1 , Lti +1 ) = µti +1 Ca1 (ati +1 , ati , K ti +1 ) + µti +2 Ca2 (ati +2 , ati +1 , Kti +2 )

(C.2)
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∀t ≥ ti + 2, that is after total uncertainty resolution:
∂Lt+
i

∂aω∗
t

=0

⇔

′
′
ω∗
ω∗
ω∗ ω∗
ω∗
ω∗
ω∗
ω∗
ω∗
λω∗
at,t σt Y (Kt , Lt ) = µt Ca 1 (at , at−1 , Kt ) + µt+1 Ca 2 (at+1 , at , Kt )

(C.3)

C.2

Calculation of the SCC

The calculation of the Social Cost of Carbon derives from first order equations relative to the variable of abatement (aω
t or āt ). After uncertainty is
resolved (t ≥ ti + 1), for a state ω, the SCC in these states of the world is:
µω∗

SCCtω∗

t+1
ω∗
′
ω∗
ω∗
ω∗
′
Ca2
(aω∗
Ca1
(aω∗
λω∗
t , at−1 , Kt ) + µω∗
t+1 , at , Kt+1 )
at,t
t
= ω∗ =
µt
σt Y (Ktω∗ , Lt )

For t = ti + 1, this formula is rewritten as:
SCCtω∗
=
i +1

′
Ca1
(aω∗
ti +1 , ati , K ti +1 ) +

µω∗
ti +2
′
ω∗
ω∗
Ca2
(aω∗
ti +2 , ati +1 , Kti +2 )
µω∗
t +1
i

σti +1 Y (K ti +1 , Lti +1 )

Before uncertainty is resolved, ∀t ≤ ti the SCC is:

SCCt =

ω
ω
′
ω
ω
ω
′
ω ω
E[µω
λat,t
t Ca1 (at , at−1 , Kt ) + µt+1 Ca2 (at+1 , at , Kt+1 )]
=
E[µω
E[µω
t]
t ]σt Y (K t , Lt )

ω
As aω
t = at for t ≤ ti , and Kt = K t for t ≤ ti + 1, the formula simplifies to

SCCt .σt Y (K t , Lt )

=
=

ω
′
ω
′
E[µω
t Ca1 (at ,at−1 ,K t )+µt+1 Ca2 (at+1 ,at ,K t+1 )]
E[µω
t ]
′
ω
E[µω
t+1 Ca2 (at+1 ,at ,K t+1 )]
′
Ca1
(at , at−1 , K t ) +
E[µω
t ]

For t ≤ ti − 1, the formula further simplifies to:
′
(at , at−1 , K t ) +
SCCt .σt Y (K t , Lt ) = Ca1

E[µω
t+1 ] ′
Ca2 (at+1 , at , K t+1 )
E[µω
t]

If we defined SCCtω as previously (see the formulas after uncertainry is resolved),
this interpretation of the social cost is tantamount to the formula: SCCt =
ω
E[µω
t SCCt ]
.
E[µω ]
t
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